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TAX NOTES
Perhaps even more disturbing is that Revenue Procedure 64-19
is only one application of the Service's position which, if applied to
other situations, could present insurmountable problems to estate
planning in general. Thus, despite this apparent taxpayer's victory,
the war is far from over. The Service will persist in its position until
the issue is resolved in the Supreme Court or at least in most of the
circuits. Until then, any estate planning must proceed on uncertain
grounds at a time when the Tax Reform Act of 1976 presents enough
uncertainty.
DAVID R. ROGOL
Scope of Tax Benefit Rule Limited
In Putoma Corp. the Tax Court decided that foregiveness of
interest indebtedness owed by a corporation (which had deducted
for the accrued but unpaid interest) to a shareholder did not
result in taxable income to the corporation because the interest
foregiveness was a contribution to capital. The authors dispute
the court's analysis and suggest a framework for future decisions
concerning this problem.
As a general proposition, when a deduction is followed in a
subsequent year by a recovery in money or property of the pre-
viously deducted liability, the taxpayer must treat the recovery as
gross income.' The item is deemed to be recovered when liability for
the item terminates.' This judicial doctrine is known as the "tax
benefit rule" and is composed of three distinct requirements: (1) an
amount previously deducted, (2) which resulted in a tax benefit,
and (3) which was recovered during the taxable year at issue.'
The Treasury Regulations provide that the tax benefit rule is
applicable to recoveries of previously deducted bad debts, taxes,
delinquency amounts, other expenditures or accruals, and all other
1. I.R.C. § 111; 1 MERTENS, LAW OF FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION § 7.4 (1974). I.R.C. §
111(a) provides: "Gross income does not include income attributable to the recovery during
the taxable year of a bad debt, prior tax, or delinquency amount, to the extent of the amount
of the recovery exclusion with respect to such debt, tax, or amount." (emphasis added).
Recovery exclusion is defined in I.R.C. § 111(b)(4) to be that amount that did not result
in a reduction of the taxpayer's tax. Treas. Reg. § 1.111-1(a) (1956) expands on the statutory
language by providing that the rule of exclusion (and thus inclusion) applies equally with
respect to all other losses, expenditures, and accruals made the basis of deductions from gross
income for prior taxable years.
2. See Bear Mfg. Co. v. United States, 430 F.2d 152 (7th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 400
U.S. 1021 (1971).
3. Estate of David B. Munter, 63 T.C. 663, 679 (1975) (Tannenwald, J., concurring).
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losses similarly recovered during the tax year.4 Recoveries of specific
items held to be within the purview of the tax benefit rule include
charitable contributions returned to the contributor,' officer's sala-
ries returned to the corporate payor,6 and supplies and similar items
expensed in the taxable year prior to an otherwise nontaxable liqui-
dation.'
The logic behind the tax benefit rule is apparent when one
considers the different accounting methods-cash and ac-
crual-that are permitted under the Internal Revenue Code. The
Code requires taxpayers to compute, on an annual basis, net income
subject to tax ("taxable income").' The income subject to tax may
be computed by the use of cash, accrual or other acceptable meth-
ods of accounting.' The method used by the taxpayer should be the
same as that by which he computes income in keeping his books."0
If the accrual method of accounting is used, income must be
reported for the period during which the right to the income be-
comes fixed" and its amount becomes determinable in light of the
circumstances existing during the taxable year. 2 Deductions are
allowable for those items which become liabilities during the year,
even though payment is not made until a subsequent taxable pe-
riod. 3 Where a deduction is properly taken by an accrual basis
taxpayer based on a computation made with reasonable accuracy
and the exact amount is determined to be different in a later taxable
year, the difference between these amounts must be accounted for
when filing an income tax return in that taxable year in which the
true amount is determined. 4
A cash method taxpayer may not take a tax deduction until the
liability or obligation of payment is fulfilled. The accrual basis tax-
payer is permitted deductions for taxable years in which an expense
4. Treas. Reg. § 1.111-1(a) (1956).
5. Alice Phelan Sullivan Corp. v. United States, 381 F.2d 399 (Ct. Cl. 1967); Rev. Rul.
76-150, 1976-1 C.B. 38.
6. See Larchfield Corp. v. United States, 373 F.2d 159 (2d Cir. 1966).
7. Spitalny v. United States, 430 F.2d 195 (9th Cir. 1970). For an excellent treatment of
the tax benefit rule as applied to corporation-shareholder relationships, see Anders v. United
States, 462 F.2d 1147 (Ct. Cl. 1972), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1064 (1972); Tennessee Carolina
Transp. Inc., 65 T.C. 440 (1975); Estate of David B. Munter, 63 T.C. 663 (1975); O'Hare,
Statutory Nonrecognition of Income and the Overriding Principle of the Tax Benefit Rule in
the Taxation of Corporations and Shareholders, 27 TAX. L. REV. 215 (1972).
8. See I.R.C. § 441.
9. See I.R.C. § 446(c).
10. I.R.C. § 446(a).
11. See Treas. Reg. § 1.446-1(c)(ii) (1957).
12. Treas. Reg. § 1.451-1(a) (1957); see I.R.C. § 451.
13. I.R.C. § 461; Tress. Reg. § 1.461-1(a)(2) (1957).
14. Treas. Reg. 4 1,461-1(a)(2) (1957).
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liability arises but no payment is made. If an accrued liability is not
paid, the tax benefit rule purports to place the accrual basis tax-
payer on an equal footing with the cash basis taxpayer. It is well
worth remembering that I.R.C. section 446(b) empowers the Com-
missioner o Internal Revenue to compute a taxpayer's income if the
method used does not clearly reflect taxable income.' 5 Moreover,
this authority can be exercised with broad power and discretion,"6
and determinations of taxable income made on the basis of section
446(b) authority will not be overturned absent a showing by the
taxpayer that the Commissioner has abused this power or acted
arbitrarily. 7
Given the above analysis, if a "properly" accrued item of ex-
pense is not paid in a later period,"8 logic and technical authority
would dictate a recapture of this deduction. Recapture would be
effected in the taxable period in which the facts and circumstances
reveal that the deduction was not warranted."
15. It is acknowledged that this provision is intended to apply to a single taxable year
and not span accrual and payment years to correct previous inaccurate accruals. It is sug-
gested, however, that the Commissioner's broad authority might empower him to use § 446(b)
to go back and correct the accrual year deduction. Notwithstanding the possible implications
of this § 446(b) authority, it would seem that it is the tax benefit rule which is intended to
reach parity in such a situation, and use of § 446(b) could create tension with the annual
accounting concept, as well as creating statute of limitations (I.R.C. § 6501) problems.
16. See Commissioner v. Hansen, 360 U.S. 446, 467 (1959); Stephens Marine, Inc. v.
Commissioner, 430 F.2d 679, 686 (9th Cir. 1970); Fort Howard Paper Co., 49 T.C. 275, 284
(1967).
17. See Schram v. United States, 118 F.2d 541 (6th Cir. 1941). The Commissioner's
authority under § 446(b) has recently been used to put a cash basis taxpayer on an accrual
basis with respect to a prepaid interest item. Andrew A. Sander, 62 T.C. 469 (1974), aff'd,
536 F.2d 874 (9th Cir. 1976). See also Commissioner v. Kuckenberg, 309 F.2d 202 (9th Cir.
1962); Family Record Plan, Inc. v. Commissioner, 309 F.2d 208 (9th Cir. 1962).
Since the Commissioner's use of § 446(b) has been sustained when applied to one item
of deduction, he might assert that this authority could be used to defeat the result reached
in Putoma, i.e., the taxpayer could be put on the cash basis for the interest payable and if
the previous year were not barred by the statute of limitations an adjustment would then be
required. See note 19 infra.
18. Naturally, it is assumed that the accrual was predicated on the intention that the
liability would eventually be paid.
19. It is submitted that the filing of an amended tax return is not always the complete
answer because of the limitations imposed by the annual accounting concept and the statute
of limitations. See, e.g., Burnet v. Sanford & Brooks Co., 282 U.S. 359 (1931); I.R.C. § 6511.
Burnet is the frequently cited Supreme Court deciiion which holds that taxable income is to
be computed on an annual period so as to produce ascertainable and regular flows of tax
revenue. Obviously, constant reopening of prior tax years cannot be acceptable if our tax
system is to function. In Burnet, the taxpayer had recovered litigation losses suffered in
previous years. The Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals held that the amounts recovered were
not income. 35 F.2d at 312. The holding was based upon an agreement whereby the taxpayer
would amend its tax returns for the years in which the payments were taken as deductions.
The Supreme Court did not accept the rationale of the lower court and held that the amount
was taxable in the year recovered. It is noted that the harsh result often produced by the
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In a recent decision, Putoma Corp., 0 the Tax Court's applica-
tion of several divergent tax principles to an accrual method tax-
payer has so eroded this logic that perhaps only Congress can resur-
rect it.
In Putoma, a shareholder sold machinery to the taxpayer corpo-
ration, taking in return an interest bearing note and a chattel mort-
gage. The corporation deducted accrued but unpaid interest on the
note. 2' Some time later, the shareholder, out of concern for the via-
bility of the corporation, cancelled the debt owed him for the unpaid
interest. The Internal Revenue Service (the Service) contended that
the forgiveness of the debt resulted in cancellation-of-indebtedness
income to the corporation or, alternatively, in income to the share-
holder for the exercise of his right to forgive the debt owed him. On
petition, the United States Tax Court held, inter alia:2 The forgive-
ness of accrued interest constitutes a nontaxable contribution to
corporate capital and not a recovery of a previously deducted item
within the meaning of the "tax benefit rule." Putoma Corp., 66 T.C.
652 (1976). It is the contention of the authors of this article that the
Tax Court in Putoma has threatened to emasculate the tax benefit
rule with the concomitant result of taxpayer windfall, by blending
the principles of cancellation-of-indebtedness income, exclusion
from income of gratuitous contributions to corporate capital, and
the tax benefit rule.
According to the majority in Putoma, when the three tax princi-
ples enumerated above have been applied to similar facts, "the tax
benefit rule has disappeared under the canopy of the cancellation
of indebtedness rule, and the cancellation of indebtedness rule has
disappeared under the canopy of the contributions to capital rule." 2
annual accounting concept is alleviated somewhat by provisions permitting carryover of net
operating losses; see I.R.C. 8 172. But see Foster Lumber Co. Inc. v. United States, 429 U.S.
32 (1976).
20. 66 T.C. 652 (1976).
21. Generally I.R.C. § 267(a) disallows a deduction for business expenses under I.R.C. §
162 if, within the taxpayer's taxable year in which these deductions are accrued plus two and
one-half months after the close thereof, these deductions remain unpaid. See Treas. Reg. §
1.267(a)-1(b)(1)(iii) (1960). This provision is qualified in that it applies only to "related"
taxpayers. For a corporation and an individual to be "related," the individual must own more
than 50 percent of the outstanding stock of the corporation. I.R.C. § 267(b)(2). Because each
shareholder owned exactly 50 percent of Putoma's outstanding stock, § 267 was inapplicable.
22. The case involved three other issues which will not be discussed: deductions for
accrued compensation, commissions, and bad debts. Putoma Corp., 66 T.C. 652 at 659-63 and
672-75.
23. 66 T.C. at 662. Prior to developing the majority's analysis, a brief overview of the
tax principles involved is in order. Gross income includes income from the discharge of
indebtedness owed the taxpayer, under I.R.C. § 61(a)(12). Thus, for example, if an individual
performs services for a creditor who in consideration thereof cancels the debt, income is
[Vol. 32:461
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Therefore, only an income exclusion rule, contributions to corporate
capital under I.R.C. section 118, remains. Given this line of reason-
ing the outcome becomes predictable. The court held forgiveness of
the accrued interest to constitute a nontaxable contribution to cor-
porate capital and not a recovery of a previously deducted item
within the meaning of the tax benefit rule."
Before dissolving the tax benefit rule into the cancellation of
indebtedness rule and in turn into the contribution to capital rule,
the majority identified the three requirements of the tax benefit
realized by the debtor in the amount of the debt. See Treas. Reg. § 1.61-12(a) (1968). See
generally Denburg, Income From the Discharge of Indebtedness: Planning and Opportunities,
41 J. TAx. 108 (1974). Taxpayers may avoid being taxed on discharge of indebtedness income
under certain circumstances by making a timely election to reduce the basis of property they
hold. See I.R.C. §§ 108, 1017. The Putoma court noted that the taxpayer had failed to make
a timely election pursuant to Treas. Reg. § 1.108(a)-2 (1967). 66 T.C. at 668, n.21. The Service
holds in Rev. Rul. 67-200, 1967-1, C.B. 15, that the benefits of §§ 108 and 1017 are available
to an accrual basis taxpayer who deducts interest which is unpaid and later forgiven. The
Ruling states that any portion of the forgiven interest which did not give rise to a tax benefit
is excludable under § 111, and any which did is excludable under § 108, provided a basis
adjustment is made pursuant to § 1017. The majority, in acknowledging the election available
under § 108, raises, but does not answer, the question of whether such an election would be
pre-empted by the tax benefit rule in situations such as that encountered in Putoma. How-
ever, the minority distinguished the two concepts in a manner which seems to suggest that
the accounting adjustment required by the tax benefit rule would override the benefits al-
lowed by § 108:
[In the cases, there has arisen some unfortunate confusion between the tax
benefit rule and the rule that income may result from the cancellation of indebt-
edness. The tax benefit rule is in effect an accounting rule. On the other hand,
the cancellation of indebtedness may, in effect, be viewed as a substitute for the
transfer of money, property, or other things of value, or it may be viewed as the
nongratuitous receipt of the goods or services which underlies the indebted-
ness-in either event, it may give rise to taxable income.
66 T.C. at 677.
In the case of a corporation, I.R.C. § 118 provides an exclusion from gross income with
respect to any contribution of money or other property to the capital of the corporate tax-
payer. Treas. Reg. § 1.118-1 (1960). See generally Behrsin, What Constitutes Contributions
to Capital is Still Unclear-Can it Be Treated as' Gift?, 44 J. TAx. 270 (1976). Section 118
applies to contributions from both shareholders and nonshareholders. Generally, contribu-
tions excludable under the provisions of § 118 are shareholders' contributions, whether in
exchange for stock or not, and for land or other property contributed by a governmental
authority to induce the corporation to locate within a particular community. I.R.C. § 362(c)
provides for the computation of basis of property received from nonshareholders. Generally
the basis of property other than money received from a nonshareholder will be zero. I.R.C. §
362(c)(1)(B).
24. The Service contended that the accrued interest was income to the shareholder when
he cancelled the debt, relying on Commissioner v. Fender Sales, Inc., 338 F.2d 924 (9th Cir.
1964). However, the Tax Court distinguished Fender Sales in which, unlike Putoma, stock
was received for the cancelled debt and the shares received had a stipulated fair market value.
This approach treats the accrued interest as being paid to the shareholder and then contrib-
uted back to the corporation. It is suggested that even an acceptance of the opinion in Fender
Sales does not bear on the issue presented by Putoma. For a discussion of how the Fender
Sales issue has been treated see articles at note 55, infra.
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rule.2" While finding that these requirements were clearly met, the
court stated that the cancellation of indebtedness principle, when
applied to a corporate-debtor and shareholder-creditor situation,
will permit a nontaxable contribution of both principal and interest
to corporate capital rather than income to the corporation. In order
to support this conclusion the court relied heavily on Helvering v.
American Dental Co." In American Dental the taxpayer accrued
and deducted rent and interest payable on obligations incurred in
the purchase of merchandise, both of which were never fully paid.
The unpaid obligations were eventually paid in part, in return for
which the creditors cancelled the debts in full. The taxpayer cred-
ited the difference between the amounts paid and the full indebted-
ness to earned surplus. None of the cancelled debts were returned
to income, although some of the debts were previously deducted in
computing taxable income. The Commissioner determined that the
cancellations which had resulted in offsets to income in prior years
should increase the taxpayer's income in the year of cancellation.
The Board of Tax Appeals sustained the Commissioner's determi-
nation." The Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reversed,
holding that the cancellations were nontaxable gifts. 2 The Supreme
Court affirmed, concluding that, notwithstanding any business or
selfish motives, the forgiveness was gratuitous and sufficient to
make the cancellation a gift within the meaning of section 22(b)(3) 21
of the 1939 Internal Revenue Code. Although the American Dental
decision did not discuss the applicability of the tax benefit rule, the
Court did observe that the cancelled indebtedness had been used to
offset income in prior years.- American Dental has since been fre-
quently cited to preclude taxation of similar cancellations.,
Finally, the majority in Putoma felt obliged to remind the Serv-
ice that it was again rejecting the argument which had been consis-
tently advanced by the Service for over fifty years-that tlhe tax
25. See text accompanying note 3 supra.
26. 318 U.S. 322 (1943).
27. 44 B.T.A. 425 (1941).
28. 128 F.2d 254 (7th Cir. 1942).
29. Section 22(b)(3) is similar to I.R.C. § 102(a) of the 1954 Code. The current judicial
definition of the term "gift" as announced in Commissioner v. Duberstein, 363 U.S. 278
(1960), probably precludes "gratuitous" treatment for shareholder foregiveness situations.
Thus, the gratuitous element of American Dental might no longer be viable authority.
30. 318 U.S. at 324.
31. In support of its interpretation of American Dental, the Putoma court cited, inter
alia, Reynolds v. Boos, 188 F.2d 322 (8th Cir. 1951); Commissioner v. Auto Strop Safety Razor
Co., 74 F.2d 226 (2d Cir. 1934); Hartland Assoc., 54 T.C. 1580 (1970); Utilities & Indus. Cbrp.,




benefit rule had superiority to the contribution to capital rule.32 The
court then suggested that the Service "play [its old record] in a
different forum. ' '3
The dissent voiced strenuous objection to the majority's super-
ficial treatment of the intended scope of the tax benefit rule,34 noting
first that the objective of tax accounting is to compute annually net
income subject to tax .3  Thus the dedu.tion is allowed on the as-
sumption that the expense will eventually be paid. However, if the
debt is modified such that it will not be paid, the taxpayer has
received a tax benefit to which he is not entitled. Given this princi-
ple of tax accounting, the dissent found "that when the grounds for
a. deduction are modified by subsequent events, there must be an
adjustment in income to reflect the changed circumstances." 31 In
further support of its proposition, the dissent cited recent case law
applying the tax benefit rule to situations generally considered to
be governed by Code provisions allowing otherwise nontaxable
treatment of certain types of transactions. 37
The dissent also differed with the majority as to the proper
32. The current position of the Service with respect to inclusion of cancelled indebted-
ness and interest thereon is found in Treas. Reg. § 1.61-12(a):
In general, if a shareholder in a corporation which is indebted to him gratuitously
forgives the debt, the transaction amounts to a contribution to the capital of the
corporation to the extent of the principal of the debt (emphasis added).
See also Rev. Rul. 76-316, 1976-2 C.B. 22, superseding Rev. Rul. 73-432, 1973-2 C.B. 17.
33. 66 T.C. at 668. Nevertheless, one might still infer that the court was somewhat
sympathetic to the Service's position by its comment: "[W]hile a theoretically correct state-
ment might indeed have merit considered de novo, we hardly write on a clean slate." Id.
34. Id. at 676-77.
35. Id. (citing Burnet v. Sanford & Brooks Co., 282 U.S. 359 (1931)). See text accompa-
nying notes 8-17 supra.
36. 66 T.C. at 676 (emphasis added), citing Mayfair Minerals, Inc. v. Commissioner, 456
F.2d 622 (5th Cir. 1972), aff'g per curiam 56 T.C. 82 (1971); Bear Mfg. Co. v. United States,
430 F.2d 152 (7th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 1021 (1971); West Seattle Nat'l Bank v.
Commissioner, 288 F.2d 47 (9th Cir. 1961), aff'g 33 T.C. 341 (1959); Merchants Nat'l Bank
v. Commissioner, 199 F.2d 657 (5th Cir. 1952), aff'g 14 T.C. 1375 (1950); Alice Phelan Sullivan
Corp. v. United States, 381 F.2d 399 (Ct. Cl. 1967); Motor Products Corp., 47 B.T.A. 983
(1942), aff'd per curiam, 142 F.2d 449 (6th Cir. 1944). These cases involve accrual basis
taxpayers who were required to include in income amounts accrued and deducted in previous
years and "recovered" in a later year. In Bear Mfg. the court held that royalties accrued and
deducted as expense in a prior year but unpaid were income in the year the taxpayer adjusted
its books to eliminate the liability. In Merchants Nat'l Bank the taxpayer was required to
include in income the amount of notes previously charged off as bad debts when sold in a
liquidation transaction. In Mayfair Minerals the taxpayer took a deduction for contingent
refunds which it was required to return to customers by order of the Federal Power Commis-
sion. When a rate increase was granted the taxpayer by the FPC and the refund liability
terminated, the court held the taxpayer had to report in income the amount previously
deducted. The inclusion was required over the taxpayer's assertion that the statute of limita-
tions barred assessment of additional tax. See note 19 supra.
37. See cases cited in note 7 supra.
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interpretation to be accorded the cases~l cited by the latter in sup-
port of overriding the tax benefit rule in favor of the contributions
to capital principle. According to the dissent, in American Dental
and the cases that have since been decided on its authority, the
question for decision was whether cancellation of indebtedness in-
come was realized and not whether an accounting adjustment was
required as a result of a recovery of an item previously deducted.
Thus, the dissent felt that the court should not be constrained by
its earlier decisions or those of other courts to conclude that the
forgiveness of indebtedness in Putoma resulted in a nontaxable con-
tribution to corporate capital. The dissent suggested an example to
illustrate the distinction between the tax benefit rule,'3 and the rule
that income may result from the cancellation of indebtedness:"
[I]f a taxpayer, who uses the accrual method of accounting,
incurs a liability to pay $100 of rent in 1976, the deduction results
in a tax savings for him. If the liability for rent is forgiven in 1977,
there must be an accounting adjustment. If the cancellation of
the liability was gratuitous, the accounting adjustment is the
only tax consequence of such cancellation. The taxpayer is then
in the same situation as a taxpayer who used the cash method of
accounting and who would therefore never have been entitled to
the deduction and the tax saving. On the other hand, if the liabil-
ity was forgiven as a means of paying the debtor for services
rendered, the debtor is required to report $100 as income in such
year and pay a tax on it. In effect, the debtor has fulfilled his
obligation to pay rent for the preceding year, and the creditor has
handed that money back to him as payment for services ren-
dered. Although the debtor is required to pay an additional tax
in 1977 in both situations, that result comes about for different
reasons.41
In concluding, the dissent noted that the Tax Court was ex-
pected to have expertise in tax matters and to apply properly the
principles of tax law. Moreover, the dissent indicated that the fail-
ure to clarify the application of the tax benefit rule invites unneces-
sary and complex congressional action.42
Although the majority opinion is well reasoned and initially
appears defensible, it is submitted that the holding misperceives
38. See cases cited at note 3 supra.
39. The tax benefit rule was characterized as an accounting rule. 66 T.C. at 677.
40. This rule was characterized as a substitute for the transfer of money or the nongratui-
tous receipt of goods or services which underlies the indebtedness, resulting in the application
of the contribution to capital rule. Id.
41. Id. at 677-78 (emphasis added).
42. Id. at 679-80.
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judicial precedent and violates fundamental tax accounting princi-
ples in favor of historical commentary. 3
The majority's reliance upon American Dental and its succes-
sors seems misplaced, since the creditors in American Dental were
not shareholders. The distinction is not one without a difference,
given that the peculiar relationship between closely held corpora-
tions and shareholders is one often subject to Code restrictions
aimed at discouraging tax avoidance schemes." Furthermore, it is
suggested that an extended discussion of the cases on point dis-
cussed in Putoma is not necessary to formulate a persuasive rule to
be used in future decisions, including the instant case's appeal." If
a simple analysis of the issue is made, a simple answer emerges. If
a creditor-shareholder forgives a debt, the result is a contribution
to capital under I.R.C. section 118, but only of the principal of the
debt. The accrued interest upon such debt is not covered by section
118, and is therefore not a contribution to capital. For this reason,
the tax benefit rule should not, in the words of the majority,
"disappear under the contribution to capital canopy,"" and the
taxpayer should be taxed to the extent of his previous deductions
for accrued interest. This line of reasoning is supported by case
law. 7
43. The majority opinion phrased it thusly: "a page of history is worth a volume of logic."
Id. at 666. One cannot seriously doubt the theoretical merit of this statement, but one must
remember that a "page" is without meaning when the purpose of the "volume" is overlooked.
44. The unfortunate interpretation accorded American Dental is best seen in an opinion
filed only two months later. In Brown Cab Co. [1943] 1 Tax Ct. Mem. Dec. (CCH) 450, the
Tax Court, without substantive discussion, vacated its prior well-reasoned decision ([1943]
1 Tax Ct. Mem. Dec. (CCH) 448) which had held that principal indebtedness is distinguished
from interest and held under Jane Holding Corp., that the cancellation of the latter is income.
45. Appeal docketed, No. 77-1591 (5th Cir. 1977).
46. 66 T.C. at 666.
47. Helvering v. Jane Holding Corp., 109 F.2d 933 (8th Cir. 1940), rev'g Edward Mal-
linckrodt, Jr., 38 B.T.A. 960 (1938). In Jane the court held that there was a distinction
between the debt principal and interest accrued thereon, and thus the cancellation was
taxable. The court said: "An obligation, once deducted but not paid, represents income when,
because of subsequent circumstances, it is cancelled or. . .will never be enforced." 109 F.2d
at 941-42. The court in Jane indicated in dicta that its opinion would be appositive to that
of Commissioner v.. Auto Strop Safety Razor, 74 F.2d 226 (2nd Cir. 1934), if that court meant
not to distinguish between principal and accrued interest. In Auto Strop Safety Razor an
accrual basis subsidiary owed over two million dollars in royalties, interest and principal
indebtedness to its cash basis parent. The court held that the cancellation of such indebted-
ness did not result in income to the subsidiary, but rather a contribution to the capital of
the corporation. In response to the Commissioner's assertion that the indebtedness had served
to reduce taxes in previous years, the appellate court refused to decide the case on that point
as the Board of Tax Appeals had not made any findings of fact on the point. In dicta however,
the court expressed its opinion that such fact would not change its decision. Also in dicta,
the court expressed the following theory which could lend some support for overruling
Putoma: "When the indebtedness was cancelled whether or not it was a contribution to the
19771
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Numerous authors have recognized that the judicial treatment
of the forgiveness of shareholders' accrued and deducted salaries
and interest as nontaxable contributions to corporate capital pro-
vides taxpayers with an unintended windfall. 8 Requiring the appli-
cation of the tax benefit rule at the corporate level to force inclusion
of income to the extent of the previous tax benefit comports with
economic reality and tax equity, and respects the separateness of
the corporate entity. 9 The Putoma decision increases the opportun-
ity for inequity via tax avoidance and disrespect for the separate
entities of corporation and shareholder. This is evident when the
parties' positions are analyzed following the forgiveness and the
finding of no liability under the Putoma court's analysis of the tax
benefit rule.
capital of the debtor depends upon considerations entirely foreign to the question of the
payment of income taxes in some previous year." 74 F.2d at 227. This statement might be
used to support the application of the tax benefit rule in Putoma.
In Walker v. Commissioner, 88 F.2d 170 (5th Cir. 1937), cert. denied, 302 U.S. 692 (1937),
interest paid on partnership indebtedness was taken as a tax deduction in the years paid. A
subsequent agreement executed between the partnership's successor (of which Walker was a
partner) and the previous creditors provided for the issuance of a non-interest bearing note
and the crediting of all interest previously paid to the outstanding balance of the principal
indebtedness. The appellate court held the cancellation of the liability and the surrender of
the note which evidenced the liability resulted in taxable gain to the taxpayer partnership
and thus its partners.
United States v. Little War Creek Coal Co., 104 F.2d 483 (4th Cir. 1939), rev'g in part
25 F. Supp. 764 (S.D.W. Va. 1938), is also enlightening. The taxpayer gave a promissory note
to a creditor in 1922. In 1926 an auditor entered on the taxpayer's books the amount of
$22,599.57, the amount of the indebtedness plus accrued interest to that date. A controversy
arose between the creditor and the taxpayer. While a suit was pending to determine that
taxpayer's liability, the taxpayer charged the payable account off its books and reported the
amount as income. Reporting this amount as income on its tax return did not result in the
payment of any tax since the tax return reflected a loss for the year. In 1929 the taxpayer
settled the account with its creditor for $20,000, deducting this amount as a loss for that year.
The court held that the charging off of the debt did not result in income as included by the
taxpayer. Additionally, the court found that $2,599.57 (the difference between the amount
owed and the final settlement) should be recognized in the year of the settlement. The
inclusion of this amount was based upon the fact that the amount set up on the taxpayer's
books was settled for less than face amount. With regard to the issue that the indebtedness
involved both principal and accrued interest, the court stated: "ilt is true ... that a part
of the $22,599.57 indebtedness was interest; but this interest was just as much a part of the
indebtedness owing by taxpayer as the principal, and presumably covered items of accrued
interest for which credit had been taken in prior returns 104 F.2d at 484 (emphasis added).
See also Howard Paper Co., Inc., 43 B.T.A. 545 (1941); Amsco-Wire Products Corp., 44
B.T.A. 717 (1941); Beacon Auto Stores, Inc., 42 B.T.A. 703 (1940); Edward Mallinckrodt, Jr.,
supra (Sternhagen, J., dissenting).
48. 9 CLEV.-MAR. L. REv. 362, 364-65 (1960); see also articles cited note 49 infra.
49. 17 HAST. L.J. 784, 786, 789, 790 (1966); see Darrell, Discharge of Indebtedness and
the Federal Income Tax, 53 HARv. L. REV. 977, 996 (1940); Surrey, The Revenue Act of 1939
and the Income Tax Treatment of Cancellation of Indebtedness, 49 YALE L.J. 1153, 1177
(1940); Comment, Taxing Salary Forgiveness, 13 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 833, 851 (1966).
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When the debt is extinguished by the shareholder, the basis for
his capital investment would be increased by the basis he had in the
accrued and forgiven indebtedness. In the case of a cash basis tax-
payer, there would be no basis in the unpaid obligation and thus its
forgiveness would not increase the basis of his capital investment.
Accordingly, upon sale, liquidation, or other disposition of his stock,
the shareholder would recognize gain-probably capital in na-
ture-that would include an increased corporate worth based upon
the accrued but never paid deduction which was transferred to capi-
tal as a contribution by the shareholder. The corporation, of course,
has had a tax deduction and resulting decrease in tax liability with-
out the burden of paying the accrued obligation upon which the
deduction was founded. Clearly, an increase in its net worth is the
result of the forgiveness of the accrued item. It may be mere specu-
lation (or even error) to assert that the increase is the full amount
of the forgiven item, but it is beyond doubt that the net worth has
increased to the extent of the tax avoided and an ordinary corporate
deduction has been transformed into a shareholder capital gain.
Moreover, the shareholder can control the year in which he will be
taxed ° Assuming proper counselling, this will occur in the year
most favorable in view of the individual's particular circumstances.
While generally the incidence of taxation should be a function of the
taxpayer's ability to pay, in Putoma the corporation's ability suf-
fered nothing by the accounting accrual and forgiveness yet its tax
liability was reduced. Of course, it can be argued that section 2671'
will generally preclude the unintended tax windfall encountered in
Putoma. " But, as the decision clearly demonstrates, section 267 is
50. The apparent windfall and shareholder ability to control the timing can be seen in
Dwyer v. United States, 439 F. Supp. 99 (D. Ore. 1977). In Dwyer a corporation was liquidated
and its obligation to pay a shareholder accrued interest was forgiven. Under the authority of
Fender Sales and Putoma the district court held that the liquidation distribution was entirely
attributable to the retired stock and not in part payment of the accrued interest. Thus, the
Service's recharacterization of the proceeds from long-term capital gain to interest income
was rejected and the inequity suggested in the text immediately preceding this note occurred.
The tax benefit issue at the corporate level was not in issue because I.R.C. § 267 was applica-
ble and therefore the corporation was not allowed a prior deduction for the unpaid interest.
However, it does not appear from the opinion that the result would have differed if § 267 was
inapplicable.
It is submitted that any item accrued with the intent of latter forgiveness, to effect a
Putoma-like result, could be effectively disallowed as being neither ordinary nor necessary
under I.R.C. § 162. This position was not asserted by the Commissioner in Putoma.
51. See discussion note 21 supra. In a recent case, Dwyer v. United States, [19771 77-2
U.S. TAX CAs. 9618 (D.C. Ore. Aug. 3, 1977) the Putoma windfall was held not available
because I.R.C. § 267 was deemed applicable.
52. The exact problem in Putoma arises only when a corporation uses the accrual method
of accounting and its shareholder uses the cash method. Where the shareholder uses the
accrual method of accounting the accrued interest would be includable in gross income when
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no panacea for forgiveness situations involving "closely-held" cor-
porations.
The Putoma holding may have been predictable in light of
Hartland Associates 3 in which the Tax Court overruled the tax
benefit rule and applied the contribution to capital principle.
Hartland should not have been controlling, however, since the court
there noted that where a shareholder-creditor's forgiveness was not
gratuitous, the rule enunciated in Helvering v. Jane Holding Corp.
might apply.54 If courts in the future feel constrained to apply the
gratuitousness test advanced in Putoma, it is submitted that the
forgiveness encountered in these situations should never be consid-
ered gratuitous. These cases typically involve an insolvent or failing
corporate taxpayer, to which shareholders, out of fear for its viabil-
ity, transfer the debt owed them to capital. The shareholders are
then receiving their quid pro quo-an increased value of corporate
investment by furtherance of corporate life.55 An innovative and
logical court would realize that the issue of gratuitousness is irrele-
vant to the applicability of the tax benefit rule because the tax
benefit rule is simply an accounting adjustment."
The decision in Putoma has limited the otherwise correctly
expanding judicial application of the tax benefit rule.57 It is submit-
ted that the result in Putoma is not required by the decision in
American Dental, and that any judicial constraint felt by the Tax
Court is self imposed and unnecessary. In addition, the court has
sub silentio invalidated Treasury Regulation section 1.61-12(a)
(1968) .5
The Service's appeal of Putoma to the Fifth Circuit is a last
attempt to win judicial approval for its position. If the Fifth Circuit
affirms, the Service will undoubtedly seek congressional action to
close the "loophole" created by this historical anomaly. However,
legislative correction is slow in the tax realm. Thus, the judiciary
deductible to the corporation, and such inclusion might alter the necessity for the accounting
adjustment espoused in this article. See O'Hare, supra note 7, at 240-44. Although this theory
would respect tax equities, it ignores the separateness of the corporate entity and allows the
corporation to retain a tax benefit to which it is no longer entitled.
53. 54 T.C. 1580 (1970). But see Rev. Rul. 76-316, 1976-2 C.B. 22, which indicates that
the Service will not follow Hartland Associates.
54. 54 T.C. at 1586 n.3. See note 47 supra.
55. See, e.g., Carroll-McCreary Co. v. Commissioner, 124 F.2d 303 (2d Cir. 1941).
56. See note 1 supra, and text accompanying note 49 supra. As indicated in note 29
supra, Duberstein probably precludes a finding of gratuitousness and, therefore, the same
result is reached.
57. See Tennessee Carolina Transp. Inc., 65 T.C. 440, 454 (1975).
58. See note 32 supra.
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would do well to appreciate the tax benefit rule for what it is-an
accounting adjustment-and not compound the rule with other sta-
tutory tax principles so as to produce taxpayer windfalls.
STEVEN M. HARRIS
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